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We present associative and causal views of differential privacy. Under
the associative view, the possibility of dependencies between data points
precludes a simple statement of differential privacy’s guarantee as con-
ditioning upon a single changed data point. However, we show that a
simple characterization of differential privacy as limiting the effect of a
single data point does exist under the causal view, without independence
assumptions about data points. We believe this characterization resolves
disagreement and confusion in prior work about the consequences of dif-
ferential privacy. The associative view needing assumptions boils down
to the contrapositive of the maxim that correlation doesn’t imply causa-
tion: differential privacy ensuring a lack of (strong) causation does not
imply a lack of (strong) association. Our characterization also opens up
the possibility of applying results from statistics, experimental design,
and science about causation while studying differential privacy.
1. Introduction
Differential Privacy is a precise mathematical property of an algorithm
requiring that it produce almost identical distributions of outputs for any
pair of possible input databases that differ in a single data point. Despite
the popularity of differential privacy in the research community, unease
with the concept remains. For example, Cuff and Yu’s paper states
“an intuitive understanding can be elusive” and expresses a preference
that differential privacy be related to more familiar concepts based on
statistical associations, such as mutual information [1, p. 2]. This and
numerous other works exploring similar connections between differential
privacy and statistical association each makes assumptions about the
data points (e.g., [2, p. 9] [3, p. 32], [4, p. 4], [5, p. 14], [6, p. 6]).
The use of such assumptions has led to some papers stating that dif-
ferential privacy implicitly requires some assumption: that it requires
the data points to be independent (e.g., [7, p. 2], [8, p. 1], [9, p. 2], [10,
p. 3], [11, p. 7], [12, p. 232], [13, p. 1]), that the adversary must know all
but one data point, the so-called strong adversary assumption (e.g., [1,
p. 2], [9, p. 10]), or that either assumption will do (e.g., [14, §1.2]). (Ap-
pendix A.3 provides quotations.) Conversely, other works assert that no
such assumption exists (e.g., [15, 16, 17, 18]). How can such disagree-
ments arise about a precise mathematical property of an algorithm?
We put to rest both the nagging feeling that differential privacy should
be expressed in more basic terms and the disagreement about whether
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Ada’s status R1 Byron’s status R2 n - 2 other people’s statuses
Ada’s data point D1 Byron’s data point D2 n - 2 other data points
Survey output O
(1)
(2) (3) (4)
(5)
\epsilon 
\epsilon (6)
(n - 2)\epsilon 
(7)
Figure 1: A causal diagram approxi-
mating the process through which the
output of a statistical query is gener-
ated and used. The arrows represent
direct causal effects. Indirect cause ef-
fects can be inferred from taking the
transitive closure of the arrows. \epsilon labels
causal effects bounded by \epsilon -differential
privacy. (1)–(7) serve as labels naming
arrows.
it makes various implicit assumptions. We do so by showing that dif-
ferential privacy is better understood as a causal property than as an
associative one. We show that differential privacy constrains effect sizes,
a basic concept from empirical science about how much changing one
variable changes another. This view does not require any independence
or adversary assumptions.
Furthermore, we show that the difference between the two views over
whether differential privacy makes assumptions is precisely captured as
the difference between association and causation. That some fail to get
what they want out of differential privacy (without making an assump-
tion) comes from the contrapositive of the maxim correlation doesn’t
imply causation: differential privacy ensuring a lack of (strong) causa-
tion does not imply a lack of (strong) association. Given the common
confusion of association and causation, and that differential privacy does
not make its causal nature explicit in its mathematical statement, we
believe our work explains how disagreement could have arose in the
research literature about the what assumptions differential privacy re-
quires.
1.1 Motivating Example and Intuition
To provide more details, let us consider an example of using differential
privacy inspired by Kifer and Machanavajjhala [7]. Suppose Ada and her
son Byron are considering participating in a differentially private survey
with n  - 2 other people. The survey collects a data point from each
participant about their health status with respect to a genetic disease.
Since Ada and Byron are closely related, their data points are closely
related. This makes them wonder whether the promise of differential
privacy becomes watered down for them, a worrying prospect given the
sensitivity of their health statuses.
Figure 1 summarizes what would happen if both Ada and Byron par-
ticipate in the survey. In it, each solid arrow represents a causal rela-
tionship where the quantity at the start of the arrow causally affects the
quantity at the end of the arrow. For example, Arrow (1) represents that
Ada’s genetics has a causal effect on her son Byron’s genetics. We use
an arrow since causation is directional: Byron’s genetics does not have
a causal effect on Ada’s. Arrow (2) represents a mechanism by which
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Ada provides her status to the survey. This information becomes a data
point in the survey’s data set, that is, a row in a database. This database
comprises Ada’s data point, Byron’s data point, and n - 2 other people’s
data points. Arrows (5), (6), and (7) together represent the algorithm
that computes the survey’s result, that is, the output produced from the
database using a differentially private algorithm.
As mentioned, Ada’s status also affects the status of her son Byron,
shown with Arrow (1). Therefore, their statuses are statistically as-
sociated (i.e., not probabilistically independent). While causation is
directional, such associations are not: seeing Byron’s status reveals in-
formation about Ada’s status despite not causing Ada’s status. Fur-
thermore, Ada’s and Byron’s data points will be statistically associated
because they have a common cause, Ada’s status. Thus, seeing Byron’s
data point reveals information about Ada’s status and data point, and
seeing Ada’s data point reveals information about Byron’s status and
data point. Since both Ada’s and Byron’s data points reveal informa-
tion about Ada’s status, the output can be informed by two data points
about Ada’s status. This double dose of information is what gives Ada
pause about participating. Furthermore, much the same applies to By-
ron.
Now, let us consider what differential privacy provides in this example.
In the words of Kasiviswanathan and Smith [16, p. 2], differential privacy
intuitively ensures that
changing a single individual’s data in the database leads to a
small change in the distribution on outputs.
(\ast )
This intuitive consequence of differential privacy, denoted as “(\ast )”, does
not make explicit the notion of change intended. It implicitly compares
the distribution over the output, a random variable O, in two hypo-
thetical worlds, the pre- and post-change worlds. If we focus on the
individual Ada and let D1 be a random variable representing her data
point as it changes values from d1 to d\prime 1, then the comparison is between
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o when D1=d1] and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o when D1=d\prime 1]. The part of this char-
acterization of differential privacy that is informal is the notion of when,
which leaves the notion of change imprecise. Our paper contrasts various
interpretations of change and when.
The most obvious interpretation is that of conditioning upon two dif-
ferent values for the changed status. This interpretation implies an ap-
proximation of statistical independence between an individual’s data
point and the output: \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o | D1=d1] \approx \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o | D1=d\prime 1]. Pre-
suming the data points are truthful, such an approximate independence
implies (up to a factor) an approximate independence that compares
probabilities over a status with or without knowing the output, that is,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[R1=r1 | O=o] \approx \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[R1=r1]. In this case, observing the output re-
veals little about an individual’s status, explaining this interpretation’s
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appeal.
However, as discussed above, both Ada’s and Byron’s data points
reveal information about each of their statuses since associations depend
upon the full breadth of causal relations. This double dose of information
about their statuses means that differential privacy does not actually
imply this appealing form of approximate independence. Thus, attempts
to interpret differential privacy in terms of conditioning fail to hold in
the presence of the associations between the data points. Those desiring
an associative guarantee from differential privacy must rule out such
double doses of information, for example, by assuming that the data
points lack any associations or that the adversary already knows all but
one data point, making such associations uninformative.
Now, let us instead consider interpreting differential privacy in terms
of causal interventions. This interpretation models artificially altering
the value of random variables, as in a randomized experiment. The key
difference between intervening upon a random variable and conditioning
upon it is that while intervening tracks causal effects by accounting for
how the intervention may cause other variables to change, it does not
depend upon all the associations in the database since such interven-
tions break them. Thus, while associative definitions using conditioning
depends upon the distribution producing data points, causal ones can
screen off this distribution to examine the behavior of just the differential
privacy algorithm itself by intervening upon all its outputs.
For example, suppose Byron is born without the genetic disease and
a scientist flips a coin and ensures that Byron has the disease if it comes
up heads and ensures that he does not if it comes up tails. (While
the technology to execute this experiment is currently wanting, it is
conceptually possible.) Since Bryon starts without the disease, the tails
outcome does nothing and can be viewed a control treatment while the
heads outcome causes a change. If it comes up heads, the scientist
could measure various things about Byron to see what changed from
giving him the disease. In particular, Byron’s data point and the output
computed from it would change. On the other hand, nothing would
change about Ada since causation is directional. (Section 4 makes this
more precise.) In fact, after the randomization, Bryon’s status and data
point no longer reveals any information about Ada’s status since the
randomization broke the association between their statuses.
The scientist can measure the size of any changes to compute an effect
size. The effect size for Byron’s data point would be large since the
data point is supposed to be equal to the status, but the effect size for
the output will be small since it is computed by an algorithm with \epsilon -
differential privacy. If we instead consider intervening on Ada’s status,
we find two paths to the output: one via Ada’s data point (Arrows (2)
and (5)) and another via Byron’s (Arrows (1), (3), and (6)). These
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two paths mean that the effect size could be as much as double that of
changing Byron’s status. Thus, differential privacy cannot be interpreted
as limiting the effect of changing Ada’s status to just \epsilon in size.
Recall that the intuitive characterization (\ast ) of differential privacy re-
ferred to data points, not statuses: “changing a single individual’s data in
the database. . .” [16, p. 2]. So, let us consider intervening upon the data
points instead. Each data point is piped directly into the differentially
private algorithm and has no other effects. Thus, differential privacy
does bound the effect size at \epsilon for Ada’s data point without making any
assumptions about the relationships between statuses. For this reason,
we believe differential privacy is better understood as a bound on effect
sizes than as a bound on associations.
We believe that ease of conflating associative and causal properties ex-
plains the disagreement in the research literature. (See Appendix A for
a history of this disagreement.) Our observation also reduces the ben-
efits and drawbacks of these implicitly associative and causal views of
privacy to those known from studying association and causation in gen-
eral. For example, the causal view only requires looking at the system
itself (causation is an inherent property of systems) while the associative
view requires looking at the input distribution as well. This difference
explains why papers implicitly with the associative view discuss the dis-
tribution over data points despite the definition of differential privacy
and the implicitly causal papers do not mention it.
The causal characterization also requires us to distinguish between an
individual’s attributes (Ris) and the data that is input to an algorithm
(Dis), and intervenes on the latter. Under the assumption that individ-
uals report their true statuses, the associative interpretation does not
require this distinction since conditioning on one is identical to condi-
tioning on the other. This distinction captures an aspect of the difference
between protecting “secrets about you” (Ri) and protecting “secrets from
you” (Di) pointed out by McSherry [17, 18], where differential privacy
protects the latter in a causal sense. An individual’s attribute Ri is about
him and its value is often outside of his control. On the other hand, an
individual’s data point Di, at least in the setting typically envisioned
for differential privacy, is under his control and is volunteered by the
individual, making it from him.
1.2 Overview
Our main goal is to demonstrate that differential privacy can be un-
derstood as a causal property without needing the sorts of assumptions
made to view it as an associative property. We lay out the associa-
tive view by surveying definitions presented in prior work to show its
awkward fit for differential privacy and how it leads to suggestions that
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differential privacy makes assumptions. We then turn to the causal view,
replacing conditioning with interventions in the associative definitions.
Doing so reveals three key insights; we find that the causal definitions
(1) work without such assumptions, (2) provides a tight characterization
of differential privacy, and (3) explains how differential privacy maps to
a concept found throughout statistics and science, namely to a measure
of effect sizes.
We start our analysis with the associative view, which uses condition-
ing (Section 3). We first consider conditioning upon all the data points
instead of just the changed one. After dealing with some annoyances
involving the inability to condition on zero-probability data points, we
get a precise characterization of differential privacy (Definition 2). How-
ever, this associative definition does not correspond well to the intuitive
characterization (\ast ) of differential privacy’s key consequences: whereas
the above-quoted characterization refers to just the changed data point,
this associative definition refers to them all, thereby blurring the char-
acterization’s focus on change.
Next, we modify the associative definition to condition upon just the
single changed data point (Definition 3). The resulting definition pro-
hibits more than an \epsilon degree of correlation between the data point and
the output, hereby limiting what can be learned about the data point.
While this definition is not implied by differential privacy on its own, it
is implied with an additional assumption of independence between data
points (Definition 4). We believe that this explains the claim found in
some papers that differential privacy implicitly assumes independence.
However, we do not share this feeling since the independence assump-
tion is not required to get differential privacy to imply the intuitive
consequence (\ast ) quoted above when interpreting change as a causal in-
tervention instead of as associative conditioning. After reviewing the
core concepts of causal modeling (Section 4), we consider intervening
upon all the data points (Section 5.1). As with conditioning upon all
the data points, a definition intervening on all the data points (Defini-
tion 6) characterizes differential privacy (Proposition 3) but without the
intuitive focus on a single data point that we desire.
We then consider characterizing differential privacy as intervening
upon a single point (Definition 7 of Section 5.2). A benefit of this causal
characterization is that it is implied by differential privacy without any
assumptions about independence (Proposition 4). An additional bene-
fit is that, unlike the associative characterizations, we do not need side
conditions limiting the characterization to data points with non-zero
probabilities. This benefit follows from causal interventions being de-
fined for zero-probability events unlike conditioning upon them. These
two benefits lead us to believe that differential privacy is better viewed
as a causal property than as an associative one.
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Num. \scrP Conditions on population distribution \scrP Point of comparison (should be stable as di changes) Relation
Original Differential Privacy
1 n/a \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , di, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] is DP
Associative Variants
2 \forall \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn] \updownarrow DP
3 \forall \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=di] > 0 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=di] \rightarrow DP
4 \forall indep. Di \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=di] > 0 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=di] \updownarrow DP
Causal Variants
5 \forall \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn)] \updownarrow DP
6 given \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn)] \updownarrow DP
7 given \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)] \leftarrow DP
8 \forall \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)] \updownarrow DP
Table 1: Differential Privacy and Vari-
ations upon It. The left-most column
gives the number of its definition later
in the text. The point of comparison is
the quantity computed for every pair of
values di and d\prime i for di to check whether
the point of comparison’s values for di
and for d\prime i are within a factor of e
\epsilon of
one another. The check is for all values
of the index i. Some of the definitions
only perform the comparison when the
probability of the changed data point
Di having the value di (and d\prime i, the
changed value) is non-zero under \scrP .
Others only perform the comparison
when all the data points D having the
values d (and d\prime for changed value of
Di) has non-zero probability. \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o} de-
notes a causal intervention instead of
standard conditioning [19]. The def-
initions vary in whether they require
performing these comparisons for just
the actual probability distribution over
data points \scrP or over all such distri-
butions. In one case (Definition 4), the
comparison just applies to distributions
where the data points are independent
of one another.
In addition to considering the consequences of differential privacy
through the lenses of association and causation, we also consider how
these two approaches can provide definitions equivalent to differential
privacy. Table 1 shows our key results about definitions that are either
equivalent to differential privacy or might be mistaken as such, which, in
the sections below, we weave in with our aforementioned results about
characterizations of the consequences of differential privacy.
When intervening upon all data points, we get equivalence for free
from Definition 6 that we already explored as a characterization of the
consequences of differential privacy. This free equivalence does not occur
for conditioning upon all data points since the side condition ruling out
zero-probability data points means those data points are not constrained.
Since differential privacy is a restriction on all data points, to get an
equivalence, the definition must check all data points. To achieve this,
we further require that the definition hold on all distributions over the
data points, not just the naturally occurring distribution. (Alternatively,
we could require the definition to hold for any one distribution with non-
zero probabilities for all data points, such as the uniform distribution.)
We also make similar alterations to the definitions looking at a single
data point.
Having shown that differential privacy can be viewed as a causal prop-
erty, we then consider how this view can inform our understanding of
it. We relate differential privacy to a previously studied notion of ef-
fect size and discuss how this more general notion can make discussions
about privacy more clear (Section 6). In particular, differential pri-
vacy is a bound on the measure of effect size called relative probabilities
(also known as relative risk and risk ratio). That is, differential privacy
bounds the relative probabilities for the effects of each data point upon
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the output. Since not all research papers are in agreement about what
counts as an individual’s data point, spelling out exactly which random
variables have bounded relative probabilities may be more clear than
simply asserting that differential privacy holds for some implicit notion
of data point.
We then consider in more detail the relationship between our work
and that of Kasiviswanathan and Smith [16] (Section 7). In short, Ka-
siviswanathan and Smith provide a Bayesian interpretation of differen-
tial privacy whereas we provide a complementary causal one.
As we elaborate in the conclusion (Section 8), these results open up
the possibility of using all the methods developed for working with cau-
sation to work with differential privacy. Furthermore, it explains why
researchers have found uses for differential privacy out side of privacy
(e.g., [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]): they are really trying to limit effect sizes.
2. Prior Work
The paper coining the term “differential privacy” recognized that causa-
tion is key to understanding differential privacy: “it will not be the pres-
ence of her data that causes [the disclosure of sensitive information]” [25,
p. 8]. Despite this causal view being present in the understanding of dif-
ferential privacy from the beginning, we believe we are first to make it
mathematically explicit and precise, and to compare it explicitly with
the associative view.
Tschantz et al. [26] reduces probabilistic noninterference (a notion of
having no flow of information) to having no casual effect at all. We ob-
serve that differential privacy with \epsilon = 0 is identical to noninterference,
implying that the \epsilon = 0 case of differential privacy could be reduced to
causal effects. Our work generalizes from non-interference to differential
privacy and thereby differs in having additional bookkeeping to track
the size of the effect for handling the \epsilon > 0 case, where an effect may be
present but must be bounded. Importantly, this generalization allows us
to compare the causal and associative views of differential privacy, not
a focus of [26].
Our work is largely motivated by wanting to explain the difference
between two lines of research papers that have emerged from differen-
tial privacy. The first line, associated with the inventors of differen-
tial privacy, emphasizes differential privacy’s ability to ensure that data
providers are no worse off for providing data (e.g., [25, 16, 17, 18]).
The second line, which formed in response to limitations in differential
privacy’s guarantee, emphasizes that an adversary should not be able
to learn anything sensitive about the data providers from the system’s
outputs (e.g., [7, 8, 9, 27, 10, 11, 12, 13]). The second line notes that
differential privacy fails to provide this guarantee when the data points
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from different data providers are associated with one another unless
one assumes that the adversary knows all but one data point. McSh-
erry provides an informal description of the differences between the two
lines [17]. While not necessary for understanding our technical devel-
opment, Appendix A provides a history of the two views of differential
privacy.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith look at a different way of comparing the
two views of differential privacy, which they call Semantic Privacy [16].
They study the Bayesian probabilities that an adversary seeing the sys-
tem’s outputs would assign to a sensitive property. Whereas other
works looking at an adversary’s beliefs, such as Pufferfish [27], bounds
the change in the adversary’s probabilities before and after seeing the
output, Kasiviswanathan and Smith bound the change between adver-
sary’s probabilities after seeing the output for two difference inputs,
much as differential privacy compares output distributions for two dif-
ferent inputs. They conclude that this posterior-to-posterior compari-
son captures the epistemic consequences of differential privacy, unlike
the anterior-to-posterior comparison made by Pufferfish-like definitions,
since differential privacy bounds it without additional assumptions, such
as independent data points. Our causal definitions (Def. 5–8) instead ex-
pose differential privacy’s causal nature with a modification of Pearl’s
causal framework as a frequentist effect size and we do not use any
Bayesian probabilities in our causal definitions. We view their Bayesian
non-causal characterization of differential privacy as complimentary to
our frequentist causal characterization, with theirs focused on an adver-
sary’s knowledge and ours on physical constraints. (We conjecture that
a Bayesian causal characterization should be possible, but leave that to
future work.) Besides the conceptual difference, our characterization is
tighter in that we show an exact equivalence between our central defini-
tion (Def. 8) and differential privacy in that each implies the other with
the same value of \epsilon , whereas their implications hold for an increased
value of \epsilon . Section 7 considers their work in more detail.
Others have explored how assumptions about the data or adversary
enables alternative reductions of differential privacy to information flow
properties. Clarkson and Schneider prove an equivalence between differ-
ential privacy and an information-theoretic notion of information sup-
pression while making the strong adversary assumption [3, p. 32]. Af-
ter making the strong adversary assumption, Cuff and Yu have argued
that differential privacy can be viewed a constraint on mutual infor-
mation [1, p. 2], but McSherry points out that the connection is rather
weak [28]. Alvim et al. bound the min-entropy and mutual informa-
tion in terms of \epsilon under assumptions about the data’s distribution [2,
p. 9]. Ghosh and Kleinberg provide inferential privacy bounds for dif-
ferential privacy mechanisms under assumptions about restricted back-
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ground knowledge [6, p. 6]. We avoid such assumptions and our causal
version of differential privacy (Def. 8) is equivalent to the original, not
merely a bound.
Instead of looking at how much an adversary learns about a single data
point, Barthe and Köpf bound how much adversary learns, in terms of
min entropy, about the whole database from a differentially private out-
put, while sometimes making the strong adversary assumption [4, p. 4].
They prove that as the database increases size, the bound increases as
well. McGregor et al. similarly bound the amount of information leaked,
in terms of mutual information, about the whole database by a differen-
tially private protocol (the information cost), while sometimes assuming
independent data points [5, p. 14]. We focus on privacy consequences to
individuals, that is, on one data point at a time.
Other papers have provided flexible or convenient associative defi-
nitions not limited to attempting to capture differential privacy. For
example, Pufferfish is a flexible framework for stating associative pri-
vacy properties [27]. Lee and Clifton explore bounding the probability
that the adversary can assign to an individual being in a data set [29].
While such probabilities are more intuitive than the \epsilon of differential
privacy, their central definition implicitly makes a strong adversary as-
sumption [29, Def. 4].
3. Differential Privacy as Association
Dwork provides a well known expression of differential privacy [25, p. 8]:
Definition 2. A randomized function \scrK gives \epsilon -differential privacy if
for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all
S \subseteq \itR \ita \itn \itg \ite (\scrK ),
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\scrK (D1) \in S] \leq \mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}(\epsilon )\times \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\scrK (D2) \in S] (1)
In our notation, it becomes
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -
differentially private if for all i, for all data points d1, . . . , dn in \scrD n and
d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output values o,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , d\prime i, . . . , dn\rangle )=o]
This formulation differs from Dwork’s formulation in four minor ways.
First, for simplicity, we restrict ourselves to only considering programs
producing outputs over a finite domain, allowing us to use notation-
ally simpler discrete probabilities. Second, we change some variable
names. Third, we explicitly represent that the probabilities are over the
randomization within the algorithm \scrA , which should be understood as
physical probabilities, or frequencies, not as epistemic probabilities, or
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Bayesian credences. Fourth, we use the bounded formulation of differen-
tial privacy, in which we presume a maximum number n of individuals
potentially providing data. In this formulation, it is important that one
of the possible values for data points is the null data point containing
no information to represent an individual deciding to not participate.
Both Dwork’s expression of and our re-expression of differential pri-
vacy make discussing the concerns about dependencies between data
points raised by some papers difficult since it does not mention any dis-
tribution over data points. This omission is a reflection of the standard
view that differential privacy does not depend upon that distribution.
However, to have a precise discussion of this issue, we should introduce
notation for denoting the data points. We use Yang et al.’s expression
of differential privacy as a starting point [14, p. 749]:
Definition 4. (Differential Privacy) A randomized mechanism \scrM satis-
fies \epsilon -differential privacy, or \epsilon -DP, if
DP (\scrM ) := \mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{p}
i,\bfx  - i,xi,x\prime i,S
\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{g}
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(r \in S | xi,\bfx  - i)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(r \in S | x\prime i,\bfx  - i)
\leq \epsilon . (1)
We rewrite this definition in our notation as follows:
Definition 2 (Strong Adversary Differential Privacy). A randomized
algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -strong adversary differentially private if for all popu-
lation distributions \scrP , for all i, for all data points d1, . . . , dn in \scrD n and
d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output values o, if
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0 (1)
and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0 (2)
then
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=di, . . . , Dn=dn]
\leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] (3)
where O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
This formulation differs from Yang et al.’s formulation in the follow-
ing ways. As before, we change some variable names and only consider
programs producing outputs over a finite domain. Also, rather than us-
ing shorthand, we write out variables explicitly and denote the distribu-
tions from which they are drawn. For example, for what they denoted as
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(r \in S | x\prime i,\bfx  - i), we write \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn],
where the data points D1, . . . , Dn are drawn from the population distri-
bution \scrP and the output O uses the algorithm’s internal randomization
\scrA . This allows explicitly discussion of how the data points D1, . . . , Dn
may be correlated in the population \scrP from which they come.
Finally, we explicitly deal with data points potentially having a prob-
ability of zero under \scrP . We ensure that we only attempt to calculate the
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conditional probability for databases with non-zero probability. This in-
troduces a new problem: if the probability distribution \scrP over databases
assigns zero probability to a data point value di, we will never exam-
ine the algorithm’s behavior for it. While the algorithm’s behavior on
zero-probability events may be of little practical concern, it would al-
low the algorithm \scrA to violate differential privacy. (See Appendix B for
an example.) To remove this possibility, we quantify over all probabil-
ity distributions, which will include some with non-zero probability for
every combination of data points.
Alternately, we could have used just one distribution that assigns non-
zero probability to all possible input data points. We instead quantify
over all distributions to make it clear that differential privacy implies a
property for all population distributions \scrP . While the population dis-
tribution \scrP is needed to compute the probabilities used by Definition 2
and will change the probability of outcomes, whether or not \scrA has dif-
ferential privacy does not actually depend upon the distribution beyond
whether it assigns non-zero probability to data points. This lack of de-
pendence explains why differential privacy is typically defined without
reference to a population distribution \scrP and typically only mentions the
algorithm’s randomization \scrA .
For us, the population distribution \scrP serves to link the algorithm to
the data on which it is used, explaining the consequences of the algorithm
for that population. Since the concerns of Yang et al. and others deal
with differential privacy’s behavior on populations with correlated data
points, having this link proves useful. The following theorem shows that
its introduction does not alter the concept.
Proposition 1. Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Proof. Assume Definition 1 holds. Consider any population \scrP , index i,
data points \langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle in \scrD n and d\prime i in \scrD , and output o such that the
following holds:
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0
and
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0
Since Definition 1 holds,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , d\prime i, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (4)
Letting O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle , the above implies
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] (5)
Thus, Definition 2 holds.
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Assume Definition 2 holds. Let \scrP be a population that is i.i.d. and
assigns non-zero probabilities to all the sequences of n data points. Con-
sider any index i, data points \langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle in \scrD n and d\prime i in \scrD , and output
o. \scrP is such that
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0
and
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] > 0
both hold. Thus, since Definition 2 holds for \scrP ,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn] (6)
where O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle . Thus,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , di, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (7)
Thus, Definition 1 holds.
The standard intuition provided for the formulation of differential pri-
vacy found in Definition 2 is a Bayesian one in which we think of \scrP 
as being prior information held by an adversary trying to learn about
Di. We condition upon and fix all the values of D1, . . . , Dn except Di
to model a “strong adversary” that knows every data point except Di,
whose value varies in (3). As the value of Di varies, we compare the
probabilities of output values o. These probabilities can be thought of
as measuring what the adversary knows about Di given all the other
data points. The bigger the change in the probabilities as the value of
Di varies, the bigger the flow of information from Di to O.
The origins of this characterization of differential privacy go back to
the original work of Dwork et al., who instead call strong adversaries
“informed adversaries” [30, App. A]. However, their characterization is
somewhat different than what is now viewed as the strong adversary
characterization. This new characterization has since shown up in nu-
merous places. For example, Alvim and Andrés rewrite differential pri-
vacy this way [2, p. 5] while Yang et al. [14, Def. 4] and Cuff and Yu [1,
Def. 1] even define it thus.
Despite this intuition, there’s no mathematical requirement that we
interpret the probabilities in terms of an adversary’s Bayesian beliefs
and we could instead treat them as frequencies over some population.
In Section 7, we return to this issue where we explicitly mix the two
interpretations. Either way, we term Definition 2 to be an associative
characterization of differential privacy since (3) compares probabilities
that differ in the value of Di that is conditioned upon.
While it may seem intuitive that ensuring privacy against such a
“strong” adversary would imply privacy against other “weaker” adver-
saries that know less, it turns out that the name is misleading. Sup-
pose we measure privacy in terms of the association between Di and O,
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which captures what an adversary learns, as in (3). Depending upon
the circumstances, either a more informed “stronger” adversary or a less
informed “weaker” adversary will learn more from a data release [31, 7].
Intuitively, if the released data is esoteric information and only the in-
formed adversary has enough context to make use of it, it will learn
more. If, on the other hand, the released data is more basic information
relating something that the informed adversary already knows but the
uninformed one does not, then the “weaker” uninformed one will learn
more.
One way to make this issue more precise is to model how informed an
adversary is by the number of data points it knows, that is, the number
conditioned upon. This leads to Yang et al.’s definition of Bayesian Dif-
ferential Privacy [14, Def. 5]. Despite the name, its probabilities can be
interpreted either as Bayesian credences or as frequencies. For simplicity,
we state their definition for just the extreme case where the adversary
knows zero data points:
Definition 3 (Bayesian0 Differential Privacy). A randomized algo-
rithm \scrA is \epsilon -Bayesian0 differentially private if for all population distri-
butions \scrP , for all i, for all data points di and d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output
values o, if \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=di] > 0 and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=d\prime i] > 0 then
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=di] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=d\prime i] (8)
where O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
One might expect that differential privacy would provide Bayesian
Differential Privacy from hearing informal descriptions of them. How-
ever, Yang et al. prove that Bayesian Differential Privacy implies dif-
ferential privacy but is strictly stronger [14, Thm. 2]. Indeed, it was
already known that limiting the association between Di and the out-
put O requires limiting the associations between Di and the other data
points [31, 7]. Doing so, Yang et al. proved that differential privacy im-
plies Bayesian Differential Privacy under the assumption that the data
points are independent of one another [14, Thm. 1]. We state the result-
ing qualified form of differential privacy as follows:
Definition 4 (Independent Bayesian0 Differential Privacy). A ran-
domized algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -Bayesian0 differentially private for indepen-
dent data points if for all population distributions \scrP such that for all i
and j where i \not = j, Di is independent of Dj conditioned upon the other
data points the following holds: for all data points di and d\prime i in \scrD , and
for all output values o, if \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=di] > 0 and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [Di=d\prime i] > 0 then
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=di] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | Di=d\prime i] (9)
where O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
differential privacy as a causal property 15
On all the above math, everyone is in agreement, which we summarize
in Figure 2 and below:
(a) Differential privacy and Strong Adversary Differential Privacy are
equivalent,
(b) Differential privacy and Independent Bayesian Differential Privacy
are equivalent,
(c) Bayesian Differential Privacy and related associative properties are
strictly stronger than Differential Privacy,
(d) If we limit ourselves to strong adversaries, differential privacy and
Bayesian Differential Privacy become equivalent, and
(e) If we limit ourselves to independent data points, differential privacy
and Bayesian Differential Privacy become equivalent.
Differential Privacy Strong Adversary D.P.
Independent Bayes. D.P. Bayesian D.P.
Strong adversary
Independent data points
Figure 2: Relationships between Dif-
ferential Privacy and Associative Char-
acterizations of It. Arrows show impli-
cations. Curved, labeled arrows show,
in italics, assumptions required for the
implication. For differential privacy
to imply Bayesian Differential Privacy,
one of two assumptions must be made.More controversially, some papers have pointed to these facts to say that
differential privacy makes implicit assumptions. Some have taken (d) to
imply that differential privacy has an implicit assumption of a strong
adversary. For example, Cuff and Yu’s paper states [1, p. 2]:
The definition of (\epsilon , \delta )-DP involves a notion of neighboring database
instances. Upon examination, one realizes that this has the effect of
assuming that the adversary has already learned about all but one en-
try in the database and is only trying to gather additional information
about the remaining entry. We refer to this as the strong adversary
assumption, which is implicit in the definition of differential privacy.
Others have focused on (e) and independent data points. For example,
Liu et al.’s paper asserts [13, p. 1]:
To provide its guarantees, DP mechanisms assume that the data tuples
(or records) in the database, each from a different user, are all indepen-
dent.
Appendix A.3 provides more examples.
Those promoting the original view of differential privacy have re-
asserted that differential privacy was never intended to prevent all as-
sociative, or inferential, privacy threats and that doing so is impossi-
ble [15, 16, 17, 18]. However, this assertion raises the question: if differ-
ential privacy is not providing some form of association-based inferential
privacy, what is it providing?
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4. A Primer on Causation
We believe that the right way of thinking about differential privacy is
that it is providing a causal guarantee. Before justifying this claim, we
will review a framework for precisely reasoning about causation based
upon Pearl’s [19]. We choose Pearl’s since it is the most well known in
computer science, but our results can be translated into other frame-
works.
To explain causation, let us return to the example of Section 1.1.
Suppose that the statistic being computed is the number of data points
showing the genetic disease. A possible implementation of such a dif-
ferentially private count algorithm \scrA for a fixed number of three data
points is
\ttd \tte \ttf prog\scrA (D1, D2, D3) :
D := \langle D1, D2, D3\rangle 
O := Lap(1/\epsilon ) +
3\sum 
i=1
(1 if D[i] == \ttp \tto \tts else 0)
It takes in 3 data points as inputs, representing the statuses reported
by survey participants. It stores them in a database D and then uses
the Laplace Mechanism to provide a differentially private count of the
number of data points recording the status as positive (\ttp \tto \tts ) [30, Exam-
ple 1].
One could use a tool like the GNU Project Debugger (GDB) to check
the value of a variable as the program executes. We can think of this as
making an observation. If you observed that D[3] is negative (\ttn \tte \ttg ), you
would know that D3 and the third input were also \ttn \tte \ttg . In a probabilistic
setting, conditioning would carry out this update in knowledge.
One could also use GDB to intervene on the program’s execution and
alter D[3] to be \ttp \tto \tts . This would probabilistically increase the output’s
value. But would one learn from this that D3 is \ttp \tto \tts and no longer
\ttn \tte \ttg ? No, since the program uses assignments and not equalities to shift
the value of the right-hand-side variable into the left-hand-side variable.
D3 is a (partial) cause of D, but not the other way around. Altering
the value of D[3] only affects variables that it assigns a value to, those
they assign values to, and so forth, that is, the ones it causes. In this
example, that is only O. This reflects the difference between association
and causation.
More formally, to develop a causal interpretation of differential pri-
vacy, we start by replacing the equation O = \scrA (D) with a stronger
claim. Such equations say nothing about why this relation holds. We
use a stronger causal relation asserting that the value of the output O
is caused by the value of the input D, that is, we use a structural equa-
tion. We will denote this structural equation by O := \scrA (D) since it
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is closer to an assignment than equality due to its directionality. To
make this more precise, let \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D=d) denote an intervention setting
the value of D to d (Pearl’s do notation [19]). Using this notation,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D=d)] represents what the probability of O = o would
be if the value of D were set to d by intervention. Similar to normal
conditioning on D = d, \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D=d)] might not equal \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o].
However, \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[D=d | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(O=o)] will surely equal \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[D=d] since O is down-
stream of D, and, thus, changing O has no effects on D.
Similarly, we replace D = \langle D1, D2, D3\rangle with D := \langle D1, D2, D3\rangle . That
is, we consider the value of the whole database to be caused by the
values of the data points and nothing more. Furthermore, we require
that D1, D2, D3 only cause D and do not have any other effects. In
particular, we do not allow Di to affect Dj for i \not = j. Looking at our
example program prog\scrA , this is the case.
This requirement might seem to prevent one person’s attribute from
affecting another’s, for example, preventing a mother’s genetic condition
from affecting her child’s genetic condition. This is not the case since
D1, D2, D3 represent the data points provided as inputs to the algorithm
and not the actual attributes themselves. One could model the actual
attributes, such as genetics itself, as random variables R1, R2, R3 where
Di := Ri for all i and allow Ri to affect Rj without changing how
intervening on the Dis works. For example, prog\scrA might be called in
the following context:
\ttd \tte \ttf \ttp \ttr \tto \ttg status(R1, R3) :
R2 := R1
D1 := R1
D2 := R2
D3 := R3
prog\scrA (D1, D2, D3)
which does not say how the inputs R1 or R3 are set but does model that
R2 is assigned R1. We can graphically represent these relationships as
a graphical model, similar to the one in Figure 1 with n - 2 = 1 and an
intermediate variable D representing the database put between the data
points and the output. Note that while D1 and D2 are associated, equal
in fact, neither causes the other and they can be changed independently
of one another, which can be seen from neither being downstream from
the other.
To make the above intuitions about causation formal, we use a slight
modification of Pearl’s causal models.1 Pearl uses structural equation 1 The models we use are suggested by
Pearl for handling “inherent” random-
ness [19, p. 220] and differs from the
model he typically uses [19, Def. 7.1.6]
by allowing randomization in the struc-
tural equations FV . We find this ran-
domization helpful for modeling the
randomization within the algorithm \scrA .
models (SEMs). An SEM \scrM = \langle \scrV \sanse \sansn ,\scrV \sanse \sansx , \scrE \rangle includes a set of variables
partitioned into endogenous (or dependent) variables \scrV \sanse \sansn and background
(or exogenous, or independent) variables \scrV \sanse \sansx . You can think of the en-
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dogenous variables as being those assigned values by the programs above
and the background variables as being those provided as inputs to the
programs. \scrM also includes a set \scrE of structural equations, correspond-
ing to the assignments. Each endogenous variable X has a structural
equation X := FX(\vec{}Y ) where FX is a possibly randomized function and
\vec{}Y is a list of other variables, modeling the direct causes of X. To avoid
circularity, \vec{}Y may not include X. We call the variables \vec{}Y the parents
of X, denoted as \sansp \sansa (X).
We limit ourselves to recursive SEMs, those in which the variables
may be ordered such that all background variables come before all en-
dogenous variables and no variable has a parent that comes before it in
the ordering. We may view such SEMs as similar to a program where the
background variables are inputs to the program and the ordering deter-
mines the order of assignment statements in the program. We can make
this precise by computing the values of endogenous variables from the
values of the background variables using a method similar to assigning
a semantics to a program.
The only difference is that, rather then a single value, the inputs
are assigned probability distributions over values, which allows us to
talk about the probabilities of the endogenous variables taking on a
value. Let a probabilistic SEM \langle \scrM ,\scrP \rangle be an SEM \scrM with a probability
distribution \scrP over its background variables. We can raise the structural
equations (assignments) to work over \scrP instead of a concrete assignment
of values. (Appendix C provides details.)
Finally, to define causation, let \scrM be an SEM, Z be an endogenous
variable of\scrM , and z be a value that Z can take on. Pearl defines the sub-
model \scrM [Z:=z] to be the SEM that results from replacing the equation
Z := FZ(\vec{}Z) in \scrE of \scrM with the equation Z := z. You can think of
this as using GDB to assign a value to a variable or as aspect-oriented
programming jumping into a function to alter a variable. The sub-model
\scrM [Z:=z] shows the effect of setting Z to z. Let \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Z:=z)]
be \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM [Z:=z],\scrP [Y=y]. This is well defined even when \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z] = 0
as long as z is within in the range of values \scrZ that Z can take on.
Returning to our example, let \scrM \scrA st be an SEM representing progstatus
and \scrP be the naturally occurring distribution of data points. \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [O=o]
is the probability of the algorithm’s output being o under \scrP and coin
flips internal to \scrA . \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [O=o | Di=\ttp \tto \tts ] is that probability con-
ditioned upon seeing D1 = \ttp \tto \tts . \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=\ttp \tto \tts )] is that
probability given an intervention setting the value of D1 to \ttp \tto \tts , which
is \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st[Di:=\ttp \tto \tts ],\scrP [O=o]. \scrM \scrA st[D1:=\ttp \tto \tts ] is the program with the line as-
signing R1 to D1 replaced with D1 := \ttp \tto \tts . \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=\ttp \tto \tts )]
depends upon how the intervention on D1 will flow downstream to D
and then O.
This probability differs from the conditional probability in that setting
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D1 to \ttp \tto \tts provides no information about Dj for j \not = 1, whereas if D1
and Dj are associated, then seeing the value D1 does provide information
about Dj . Intuitively, this lack of information is because the artificial
setting of D1 to \ttp \tto \tts has no causal influence on Dj due to the data points
not affecting one another and the artificial setting, by being artificial,
tells us nothing about the associations found in the naturally occurring
world. On the other hand, artificially setting the attribute itself R1 to
\ttp \tto \tts will provide information about D2 since R1 has an effect on D2 in
addition to D1. A second difference is that \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)]
is defined even when \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA st,\scrP [Di=di] = 0.
Importantly, interventions on a data point Di do not model modifying
the attributes they record nor affect other inputs. Instead, interventions
on Di model changing the values provided as inputs to the algorithm,
which can be changed without affecting the attributes or other inputs.
This corresponds to an atomicity property: the inputs Di are causally
isolated from one another and they can be intervened upon separately.
Making the distinction between the inputs Di and the attributes Ri
might seem nitpicky, but it is key to understanding differential privacy.
Recall that its motivation is to make people comfortable with truthfully
sharing data instead of withholding it or lying, which is an acknowledg-
ment that the inputs people provide might not be the same as the at-
tributes they describe. Furthermore, that changing inputs do not change
attributes or other inputs is a reflection of how the program works. It is
not an implicit or hidden assumption of independence; it is a fact about
the program analyzed.
5. Differential Privacy as Causation
Due to differential privacy’s behavior on associated inputs and its re-
quirement of considering zero-probability database values, differential
privacy is not a straightforward property about the independence or
the degree of association of the database and the algorithm’s output.
The would-be conditioning upon zero-probability values corresponds to
a form of counterfactual reasoning asking what the algorithm would have
performed had the database taken on a particular value that it might
never actually take on. Experiments with such counterfactuals, which
may never naturally occur, form the core of causation. The behavior
of differential privacy on associated inputs corresponds to the atomicity
property found in causal reasoning, that one can change the value of
an input without changing the values of other inputs. With these mo-
tivations, we will show that differential privacy is equivalent to a causal
property that makes the change in a single data point explicit.
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5.1 With the Whole Database
We first show an equivalence between differential privacy and a causal
property on the whole database to echo Strong Adversary Differential
Privacy (Def. 2). To draw out the parallels between the associative
and causal properties, we quantify over all populations as we did in
Definition 2, but as we will see, doing so is not necessary.
Let \scrM \scrA be an SEM modeling a slightly modified version of progstatus
that lacks the first assignment and treats all of any fixed number of
attributes Ri as inputs (i.e., as exogenous variables) with Di := Ri.
(Appendix C provides details.) We could instead use a version of \scrM \scrA 
that also accounts for Di possibly being assigned a value other than
Ri to model withholding an attribute’s actual value. While the proofs
would become more complex, the results would remain the same since
we only intervene on the Di and not the Ri.
Definition 5 (Universal Whole Database Intervention D.P.). A ran-
domized algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -differentially private as universal intervention
on the whole database if for all population distributions \scrP , for all i, for
all data points d1, . . . , dn in \scrD n and d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output values
o,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn)] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn)] (10)
where O := \scrA (D) and D := \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
Proposition 2. Definitions 1 and 5 are equivalent.
Proof. Pearl’s Property 1 says that conditioning upon all the parents
of a variable and causally intervening upon them all yields the same
probability [19, p. 24]. Intuitively, this is for the same reason that Strong
Adversary Differential Privacy is equivalent to differential privacy: it
blocks other paths of influence from one data point to the output via
another data point by fixing all the data points.
We can apply Property 1 since all the Dis are being intervened upon
and they make up all the parents of D. We can apply it again on D and
O. We then get that \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn)] is equal
to \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn], that is to Strong Adversary Dif-
ferential Privacy, which we already know to be equivalent to differential
privacy by Proposition 1.
Alternately, we can grind out the calculations. See Lemma 1 in Ap-
pendix C.
Notice that this causal property is simpler than the associative one in
that it does not need qualifications around zero-probability data points
because we can causally fix data points to values with zero probability. In
fact, the population distribution \scrP did not matter at all since intervening
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upon all the data points makes it irrelevant, intuitively by overwriting
it. For this reason, we could instead look at any population, such as the
naturally occurring one (or even elide it from the definition altogether,
as in Definition 1, if we are not too picky about formalism). Next, we
state such a simplified definition.
Definition 6 (Whole Database Intervention D.P.). Given a population
distribution \scrP , a randomized algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -differentially private as
intervention on the whole database for \scrP if for all i, for all data points
d1, . . . , dn in \scrD n and d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output values o,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Dn=dn)] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d1, . . . , Di=d\prime i, . . . , Dn=dn)] (11)
where O := \scrA (D) and D := \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
Proposition 3. Definitions 1 and 6 are equivalent.
Proof. The proof follows in the same manner as Proposition 2 since that
proof applies to all population distributions \scrP .
5.2 With a Single Data Point
Definitions 5 and 6, by fixing every data point, do not capture the local
nature of the decision facing a single potential survey participant. We
can define a notion similar to differential privacy that uses a causal
intervention on a single data point as follows:
Definition 7 (Data-point Intervention D.P.). Given a population \scrP ,
a randomized algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -differentially private as intervention on a
data point for \scrP if for all i, for all data points di and d\prime i in \scrD , and for
all output values o,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d\prime i)] (12)
where O := \scrA (D) and D := \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
This definition is strictly weaker than differential privacy. The reason
is similar to why we had to quantify over all distributions \scrP with Strong
Adversary Differential Privacy. In both cases, we can give a counterex-
ample with a population \scrP that hides the effects of a possible value of
the data point by assigning the value a probability of zero. For the asso-
ciative definition, the counterexample involves only a single data point
(Appendix B). However, for this causal definition, the counterexample
has to have two data points. The reason is that, since the \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o} opera-
tion acts on a single data point at a time, it can flush out the effects
of a single zero-probability value but not the interactions between two
zero-probability values.
Proposition 4. Definition 1 implies Definition 7, but not the other
way around.
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Proof. W.l.o.g., assume i = n. Assume Definition 1 holds:
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o] (13)
for all o in \scrO , \langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle in \scrD n, and d\prime n in \scrD . This implies that for any
\scrP ,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP \bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o]
(14)
for all o in \scrO , d1, . . . , dn in \scrD n, and d\prime n in \scrD . Thus,\sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, dn\rangle )=o] \leq \sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o]
(15)\sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \ast \sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o]
(16)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Dn=dn)] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Dn=d\prime n)] (17)
where the last line follows from Lemma 2 in Appendix C.
Definition 7 is, however, weaker than differential privacy. Consider
the case of a database holding two data points whose value could be
0, 1, or 2. Suppose the population \scrP is such that \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=2] = 0 and
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D2=2] = 0. Consider an algorithm \scrA such that
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle 2, 2\rangle )=0] = 1 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle 2, 2\rangle )=1] = 0 (18)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, d2\rangle )=0] = 1/2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, d2\rangle )=1] = 1/2 when d1 \not = 2 or d2 \not = 2 (19)
The algorithm does not satisfy Definition 1 due to its behavior when
both of the inputs are 2. However, using Lemma 2 in Appendix C,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1=d\prime 1)] = 1/2
for all o and d\prime 1 since \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D2=2] = 0. A similar result holds switching
the roles of D1 and D2. Thus, the algorithm satisfies Definition 7 for \scrP 
but not Definition 1.
Despite being only implied by, not equivalent to, differential privacy,
Definition 7 captures the intuition behind the characterization (\ast ) of dif-
ferential privacy that “changing a single individual’s data in the database
leads to a small change in the distribution on outputs” [16, p. 2]. To get
an equivalence, we can quantify over all populations as we did to get an
equivalence for association, but this time we need not worry about zero-
probability data points or independence. This simplifies the definition
and makes it a more natural characterization of differential privacy.
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Definition 8 (Universal Data-point Intervention D.P.). A randomized
algorithm \scrA is \epsilon -differentially private as universal intervention on a data
point if for all population distributions \scrP , for all i, for all data points
di and d\prime i in \scrD , and for all output values o,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d\prime i)] (20)
where O := \scrA (D) and D := \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
Proposition 5. Definitions 1 and 8 are equivalent.
Proof. That Definition 1 implies 8 follows from Proposition 4.
Assume Definition 8 holds. W.l.o.g., assume i = n. Then, for all \scrP , o
in \scrO , and d\prime n in \scrD ,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=di)] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d\prime i)] (21)\sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, dn\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o]
(22)
follows from Lemma 2 in Appendix C.
For any d\dagger 1, . . . , d
\dagger 
n - 1 in \scrD n - 1, let \scrP d
\dagger 
1,...,d
\dagger 
n - 1 be such that
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}
\scrP d
\dagger 
1,...,d
\dagger 
n - 1
\Bigl[ 
\wedge n - 1i=1 Di=d\dagger i
\Bigr] 
= 1 (23)
For any d\dagger 1, . . . , d
\dagger 
n in \scrD n and d\prime n in \scrD , (22) implies\sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}
\scrP d
\dagger 
1,...,d
\dagger 
n - 1
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, ..., dn - 1, d\dagger n\rangle )=o]
\leq e\epsilon 
\sum 
\langle d1,...,dn - 1\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}
\scrP d
\dagger 
1,...,d
\dagger 
n - 1
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, ..., dn - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o]
(24)
Thus,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\dagger 1, . . . , d\dagger n - 1, d\dagger n\rangle )=o] \leq e\epsilon \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\dagger 1, . . . , d\dagger n - 1, d\prime n\rangle )=o] (25)
since both sides has a non-zero probability for
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}
\scrP d
\dagger 
1,...,d
\dagger 
n - 1
\bigl[ \wedge n - 1i=1 Di=di\bigr] 
at only the single sequence of data point values d\dagger 1, . . . , d
\dagger 
n - 1.
6. Bounding Effects: Generalizing D.P., Understand-
ing Alternatives
To recap, we have shown that reasoning about differential privacy as
a causal property is more straightforward than reasoning about it as
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an associative property. Still, one might wonder, Why express differ-
ential privacy in either form? Why not just stick with its even simpler
expression in terms of functions in Definition 1?
In this section, we show what is gained by the causal view. We show
that differential privacy bounds a general notion of effect size. Essen-
tially, differential privacy limits the causal consequences of a decision to
contribute data to a data set. If the consequences are small, then an
individual will need less encouragement (e.g., financial incentives) to set
aside privacy concerns.
We show that this general notion can also capture alternative privacy
definitions, including some arising from concerns over dependent data
points. A common causal framework allows us to precisely compare
these definitions.
6.1 Bounded Relative Probability (brp)
Generalizing from the decision to participate in a data set, we define a
more general notation for any two random variables X and Y . To do so,
we need a description of how X and Y relate to one another. Recall that
a probabilistic SEM \langle \scrM ,\scrP \rangle shows the causal and statistical relations
between random variables by providing a list of structural equations
\scrM and a distribution \scrP over variables not defined in terms of others
(exogenous variables). (See Appendix C for details.)
We will measure the size of the effects of X on Y using relative prob-
abilities, better known as relative risk and as risk ratio with clinical
studies of risks in mind. For three (binary) propositions \rho , \phi , and \psi , let
\mathrm{R}\mathrm{P}\scrM ,\scrP (\rho , \phi , \psi ) =
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [\rho | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(\phi )]
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [\rho | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(\psi )] (26)
denote the relative probability. (Some authors also allow using condi-
tioning instead of interventions.) For two random variables X and Y ,
we can characterize the maximum effect of X on Y as
\=RP\scrM ,\scrP (Y,X) = \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}
y,x1,x2
\mathrm{R}\mathrm{P}\scrM ,\scrP (Y=y,X=x1, X=x2) (27)
Expanding these definitions out shows that \epsilon -differential privacy places
a bound on the maximum of the maximum relative probabilities:
\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}
\scrP ,i
\=RP\scrM ,\scrP (O,Di) \leq e\epsilon (28)
where \scrM describes the differentially private algorithm \scrA . Note that our
use of maximization is similar Yang et al. [14, p. 749, Def. 4], which we
quote in Section 3.
With this in mind, we propose to use \=RP for a general purpose effect-
size restriction:
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Definition 9 (BRP). A causal system described by \scrM has \epsilon -bounded
relative probability ( brp) for X to Y iff
\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}
\scrP 
\=RP\scrM ,\scrP (Y,X) \leq e\epsilon 
Differential privacy is equivalent to requiring \epsilon -brp for all data points
Di.
6.2 Composition
Brp enjoys many of the same properties as differential privacy. Recall
that differential privacy has additive sequential composition for using
two differentially private algorithms one after the next, even if the second
is selected using the output of the first [32]. Similarly, brp has additive
sequential composition for two random variables.
To model the second output Z depending upon the first Y , but not
the other way around, we say random variables X, Y , and Z are in
sequence if X may affect Y and Z, and Y may affect Z, but Z may not
affect X nor Y , and Y may not affect X. That is,
X Y
Z
To model that the second output Z could be computed with one of any
of a set of algorithms but that each of algorithm has a bounded effect
from X to Z, we look at Z’s behavior in sub-models \scrM [Y := y] where
each setting of Y corresponds to a selecting one available algorithm.
Theorem 1. For any SEM \scrM such that X, Y , and Z are in sequence
and the parents of Z are \{ X,Y \} , if X has \epsilon 1-brp to Y in \scrM and \epsilon 2-brp
to Z in \scrM [Y := y] for all y in \scrY , then X has (\epsilon 1 + \epsilon 2)-brp to \langle Y, Z\rangle in
\scrM .
Proof. Consider any probability distribution \scrP , x and x\prime in \scrX , y in \scrY ,
and z in \scrZ . Since the effect of X on Y is bounded by \epsilon 1-brp,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)] \leq e\epsilon 1 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x\prime )]
Since the parents of Z are \{ X,Y \} , Pearl’s Property 1 [19, p. 24] shows
that for any y such that \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y] > 0,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | Y=y,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Y=y),\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)]
Since there’s \epsilon 2-brp from X to Z in M [Y := y] for all y, this implies
that
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | Y=y,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)] \leq e\epsilon 2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | Y=y,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x\prime )]
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Thus,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [\langle Y, Z\rangle = \langle y, z\rangle | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)]
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | Y=y,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x)]
\leq e\epsilon 2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Z=z | Y=y,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x\prime )] \ast e\epsilon 1 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [Y=y | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x\prime )]
= e\epsilon 1+\epsilon 2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM ,\scrP [\langle Y, Z\rangle = \langle y, z\rangle | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(X=x\prime )]
We can generalize this theorem for Z having additional parents by
requiring brp for all of their values as well.
The special case of this theorem where \epsilon 2 = 0 is known as the post-
processing condition:
X Y Z\epsilon 
For this causal diagram, Theorem 1 ensures that if the arrow from X to
Y is \epsilon -brp, then any subsequent consequence Z of Y is also going to be \epsilon -
brp. This captures the central intuition behind differential privacy and
brp that they limit any downstream causal consequences of a variable
X.
6.3 Application
While the explicit causal reasoning in brp can sharpen our intuitions
about privacy, brp is not itself a privacy definition. Only some choices
of variables to bound yield reasonable privacy guarantees. Below, we use
brp to express some of well known variations of differential privacy. Do-
ing so both shows some reasonable ways of using brp to provide privacy
guarantees and demonstrates that brp provides a common framework
for precisely stating and comparing these variations.
First, consider the randomized response method of providing privacy
in which each survey participant adds noise to his own response before
responding [33]. Let each person’s actual attribute be Ri, let the noisy
response he provides be Di, and let O be the output computed from all
the Di. Unlike with (standard) differential privacy, the causal path from
Di to O has unbounded brp, may not contain any random algorithms,
and misses the privacy protection altogether. Similarly, the path from
Ri and O has unbounded brp due to the possibility of the Ri having
effects upon one another. However, the randomized response method
does ensure \epsilon -brp from Ri to Di for all i where \epsilon depends upon the
amount of noise added to Di.
Second, we consider group privacy, the idea that a group of individuals
may be so closely related that their privacy is intertwined. Differential
privacy approaches group privacy by summing the privacy losses, mea-
sured in terms of \epsilon , of each individual in the group [25, p. 9]. Similarly,
we can add the relative probabilities of multiple random variables to get
a total effect size. Alternately, brp can easily be extended to measure
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simultaneous joint interventions by using multiple instances of the \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}
operator. The total effect size may be larger than the joint effect size
since, in cases where the intervened upon variables affect one another,
interventions on a downstream variable can mask interventions on its
parents. Returning to the example of Section 1.1, the total effect for
both Ada’s attribute R1 and Byron’s R2 is 3\epsilon with 2\epsilon of that coming
from R1. However, the joint effect is 2\epsilon since R1 achieved half of its
effect via R2. In examples like this where the variables correspond to
different moral entities, the total effect size strikes us as more reasonable
since it accounts for both Ada and Byron experiencing a privacy loss.
If on the other hand, the variables correspond to a single topic about
a single person, such as weight and waist size, then the joint effect size
seems more reasonable. However, we see this choice as under explored
since it does not emerge for differential privacy given that data points
cannot not affect one another.
Third, we consider a line of papers providing definitions of privacy that
account for dependencies between data points, but which are ambiguous
about association versus causation [11, 12, 13]. For example, Liu et al.
use the word “cause” in a central definition of their work [13, Def. 3], but
do no causal modeling, instead using a joint probability distribution to
model just associations in their adversary model [13, §3]. Using causal
modeling and brp would allow them to actually model causation instead
of approximating it with associations, or, if associations really is what
they wish to model, would provide a foil making their goals more clear.
Fourth, as a more complex example, Kifer and Machanavajjhala con-
sider applying differential privacy to social networks [7, §3]. They note
that differential privacy applied to a network is typically taken to mean
either considering nodes or edges labeled with an individual’s id i in
the network as that individual’s data point Di, but that participation
in a social network is likely to leave far more evidence than just those
nodes and edges. They consider an example in which Bob joins a net-
work and introduces Alice and Charlie to one another, leading them
to create an edge between them that does not involve Bob. Arguably,
protecting Bob’s privacy requires counting this edge as Bob’s as well
despite neither edge nor node differential privacy doing so. To capture
this requirement, they distinguish between differential privacy’s deleting
of data points from a data set and their desire to “hide the evidence of
participation” [7, §2.2.1].
Because “It is difficult to formulate a general and formal definition for
what evidence of participation means” [7, §3, p. 5], they use correlations
in its place for modeling public health and census records [7, §§2.1.3, 2.2,
4.1 & 4.3.1]. However, for modeling social networks, they use statistical
models that they interpret as providing “a measure of the causal influence
of Bob’s edge”, that is, informal causal models [7, §3, p. 6].
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We believe that the causal framework presented herein provides the
necessary mathematical tools to precisely reason about evidence of par-
ticipation. Causal models would allow them to precisely state which
aspects of the system they wish to protect, for example, by requiring
that Bob’s joining the network should have a bounded effect upon a
data release. While accurately modeling a social process is a difficult
task, at least the requirement is clearly stated, allowing us to return
to empirical work. Furthermore, such formalism can allow for multiple
models to be considered and we can demand privacy under each of them,
and erring on the side of safety by over-estimating effect sizes remains
an option.
Finally, causal modeling can make the choices between privacy no-
tions more clear. The distinction between direct and indirect effects [34]
can model the difference between node privacy, which only captures the
direct effects of joining a social network, and all of the evidence of par-
ticipation, which includes hard-to-model indirect effects. Edge privacy
captures the direct effect of posting additional content. Given that Face-
book has reached near universal membership but worries about disen-
gagement, this effect might be the more concerning one from paractical
perspective.
7. Restrictions on Knowledge
Privacy is often thought of as preventing an adversary from learning
sensitive information. To make this intuition precise, we can model
an adversary’s beliefs using Bayesian probabilities, or credences. We
denote them with \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}, instead of \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}, which we have been using to de-
note natural frequencies over outcomes without regard to any agent’s
beliefs. We denote the adversary’s background knowledge as B. The
knowledge of an adversary about the database D after observing the
output can be expressed as \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | O=o,B]. A natural privacy
property, termed statistical nondisclosure by Dalenius [35], requires that
\mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | O=o,B] = \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | B], that is, that the beliefs about the
database before and after observing the output are the same.
This requirement limiting the difference between prior and posterior
beliefs has been shown to be impossible to achieve under arbitrary back-
ground knowledge by Dwork and Naor, even for approximate relaxations
of statistical nondisclosure, as long as the output provides some infor-
mation [36]. As differential privacy also falls under the purview of this
impossibility result, it only provides this associative guarantee under re-
strictive background knowledge assumptions, such as independent data
points or strong adversaries. To see the need for assumptions, consider
that statistical nondisclosure implies 0-Bayesian0 Differential Privacy
(Def. 3) since both are equivalent to requiring independence between
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D and O in the case where the adversary’s background information
is the true distribution over data points. We believe such a need un-
derlies the view that differential privacy only works with assumptions
(Appendix A.3).
Kasiviswanathan and Smith’s Semantic Privacy is a property about
the adversary’s ability to do inferences that does not require such as-
sumptions [16]. It requires that the probability that the adversary as-
signs to the input data points does not change much whether an indi-
vidual i provides data or not. The probability assigned by the adversary
when each person provides his data point is
\mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | O=o,B] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d)=o] \ast \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | B]\sum 
d\prime \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d\prime )=o] \ast \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d\prime | B]
(29)
where D=d is shorthand for
\bigwedge n
j=1Dj=dj with d = \langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle . The
probability where person i does not provide data or provides fake data
is
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d - id\prime i)=o] \ast \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | B]\sum 
d\prime \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d - id\prime i)=o] \ast \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d\prime | B]
where d\prime i is the value (possibly the null value) provided instead of the real
value and d - 1d\prime i is shorthand for d with its ith component replaced with
d\prime i. While we leave fully formalizing the combining of Bayesian credences
and frequentist probabilities to future work, intuitively, this probability
is \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [D=d | O=o,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d\prime i), B] in our causal notation.
Kasiviswanathan and Smith prove that differential privacy and Se-
mantic Privacy are closely related [16, Thm. 2.2]. In essence, they show
that differential privacy ensures that \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | O=o,B] and \mathrm{C}\mathrm{r}[D=d | 
O=o,\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d
\prime 
i), B] are close in nearly the same sense as it ensures that
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o] and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Di=d\prime i)] are close. That is, it guarantees
that an adversary’s beliefs will not change much relative to whether
you decide to provide data or not, providing an inference-based view of
differential privacy.
To gain intuition about these results, let us consider the findings of
Wang and Kosinski [37], which show the possibility of training a neu-
ral network to predict a person’s sexual orientation from a photo of
their face. If this model had been produced with differential privacy,
then each study participant would know that their participation had
little to do with the model’s final form or success. However, inferential
threats would remain. An adversary can use the model and a photo of
an individual to infer the individual’s sexual orientation, whether that
individual participated in the study or not. Less obviously, an adver-
sary might have some background knowledge allowing it to repurpose
the model to predict people’s risks of certain health conditions. Such
difficult to predict associations may already be used for marketing [38]
(cf. [39]).
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An individual facing the option of participating in such a study may at-
tempt to reason about how likely such repurposing is. Doing so requires
the difficult task of characterizing the adversary’s background knowl-
edge since Dwork and Naor’s proof shows that the possibility cannot
be categorically eliminated [36]. Furthermore, if the individual decides
that the study is too risky, merely declining to participate will do little
to mitigate the risk since differential privacy ensures that the individ-
ual’s data would have had little effect on the model. Rather, the truly
concerned individual would have to lobby others to not participate. For
this reason, both the causal and associative views of privacy have their
uses, with the causal view being relevant to a single potential partici-
pant’s choice and the associative, to the participants collectively. One
can debate whether such collective properties are privacy per se or some
other value since it goes beyond protecting personal data [17].
8. Conclusion and Further Implications
Although it is possible to view differential privacy as an associative prop-
erty with an independence assumption, we have shown that it is cleaner
to view differential privacy as a causal property without such an as-
sumption. We believe that this difference in goals helps to explain why
one line of research claims that differential privacy requires an assump-
tion of independence while another line denies it: the assumption is not
required but does yield stronger conclusions.
We believe these results have implications beyond explaining the dif-
ferences between these two lines. Having shown a precise sense in which
differential privacy is a causal property, we can use the results of statis-
tics, experimental design, and science about causation while studying
differential privacy. For example, various papers have attempted to re-
verse engineer or test whether a system has differential privacy [40, 41,
42]. Authors of follow up works may leverage by pre-existing experi-
mental methods and statistical analyses for measuring effect sizes that
apply with or without access to causal models. In more detail, Tang et
al. studied Apple’s claim that MacOS uses differential privacy and at-
tempted to reverse engineer the degree \epsilon of privacy used by Apple from
the compiled code and configuration files [40]. Consider a version of this
problem in which the system purportedly providing differential privacy
is a server controlled by some other entity. In this case, the absence
of code and configuration files necessitates a blackbox investigation of
the system. From the outside, we can study whether such a system has
differential privacy as advertised by using experiments and significance
testing [43] similar to how Tschantz et al.’s prior work uses it for studying
information flow as a causal property [26]. Indeed, Ding et al. recently
used significance testing [41] and Bichsel et al. confidence intervals [42]
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to find violations of differential privacy, without naming their connec-
tions to causation or effect sizes. Alternately, using the associative view,
we could approach the problem using observational studies.
In the opposite direction, the natural sciences can use differential pri-
vacy as an effect-size metric, inheriting all the pleasing properties known
of differential privacy. For example, differential privacy composes cleanly
with itself, both in sequence and in parallel [44]. The same results would
also apply to the effect-size metric that differential privacy suggests.
Finally, showing that differential privacy is in essence a measure of
effect sizes explains why it, or properties based upon it, has shown up
in areas other than privacy, including fairness [20], ensuring statistical
validity [21, 22, 23], and adversarial machine learning [24]. While it may
be surprising that privacy is related to such a diverse set of areas, it is
not surprising that causation is, given the central role the concept plays
in science. What is actually happening is that causal reasoning is making
its importance felt in each of these areas, including in privacy. That it
has implicitly shown up in at least four areas of research suggests that
causal reasoning should play a more explicit role in computer science.
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Appendices
A. Two Views of Differential Privacy:
A Brief History
Throughout this paper, we have mentioned two lines of work about dif-
ferential privacy. The historically first line, associated with its creators,
views differential privacy as not requiring additional assumptions, such
as independent data points or an adversary that already knows all but
one data point. The historically second line views such assumptions as
needed by or implicit in differential privacy. Here, we briefly recount
the history of the two lines. We start with their historical antecedents
that pre-date differential privacy. Having not participated in differential
privacy’s formative years, we welcome refinements to our account.
A.1 Before Differential Privacy
The idea of a precise framework for mathematically modeling the condi-
tions under which an adversary does not learn something perhaps starts
with Shannon’s work on perfect security in 1949 [45]. In 1984, this idea
led to Goldwasser and Silvio’s cryptographic notion of semantic security,
which relaxes Shannon’s requirement by applying to only polynomially
computationally bounded adversaries [46] (with antecedents in their ear-
lier 1982 work [47]).
Apparently independently, the statistics community also considered
limiting what an adversary would learn. One early work cited by differ-
ential privacy papers (e.g., [25]) is Dalenius’s 1977 paper on statistical
disclosure [35]. Dalenius defines statistical disclosures in terms of a
frame of objects, for example, a sampled population of people [35, §4.1].
The objects have data related to them [35, §4.2]. A survey releases some
statistics over such data for the purpose of fulfilling some objective [35,
§4.3]. Finally, the adversary may have access to extra-objective data,
which is auxiliary information other than the statistics released as part
of the survey. Dalenius defines a statistical disclosure as follows [35, §5]:
If the release of the statistics S makes it possible to determine the value
DK more accurately than is possible without access to S, a disclosure
has taken place [. . .]
where DK is the value of the attribute D held by the object (e.g., person)
K. The attribute D and object K may be used in the computation of S
or not. The extra-objective data may be used in computing the estimate
of DK .
As pointed out by Dwork [25], Dalenius’s work is both similar to and
different from the aforementioned work on cryptosystems. The most
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obvious difference is looking at databases and statistics instead of cryp-
tosystems and messages. However, the more significant difference is the
presence of the objective with a benefit, or the need for utility in Dwork’s
nomenclature. That is, the released statistics is to convey some informa-
tion to the public; whereas, the encrypted message, the cryptosystem’s
analog to the statistic, only needs to convey information to the intended
recipient. Dalenius recognized that this additional need makes the elim-
ination of statistical disclosures “not operationally feasible” and “would
place unreasonable restrictions on the kind of statistics that can be re-
leased” [35, §18].
Even before the statistics work on statistical nondisclosure, statistical
research by S. L. Warner in 1965 introduced the randomized response
method of providing differential privacy [33]. (His work is more similar
to the local formulation of differential privacy [48].) The randomized
response model and statistical disclosure can be viewed as the prototypes
of the first and second lines of reseach respectively, although these early
works appear to have had little impact on the actual formation of the
lines of reseach over a quarter century later.
A.2 Differential Privacy
In March 2006, Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith presented a pa-
per containing the first modern instance of differential privacy under the
name of “\epsilon -indistinguishable” [30]. The earliest use of the term “differen-
tial privacy” comes from a paper by Dwork presented in July 2006 [25].
This paper of Dwork explicitly rejects the view that differential privacy
provides associative or inferential privacy [25, p. 8]:
Note that a bad disclosure can still occur [despite differential privacy],
but [differential privacy] assures the individual that it will not be the
presence of her data that causes it, nor could the disclosure be avoided
through any action or inaction on the part of the user.
and further contains a proof that preventing Dalenius’s statistical dis-
closures while releasing useful statistics is impossible. (The proof was
joint work with Naor, with whom Dwork later further developed the
impossibility result [36].) She defines differential privacy as follows, a
presentation that implicitly promotes a causal view [25, pp. 8–9]:
As noted in the example of Terry Gross’ height, an auxiliary information
generator with information about someone not even in the database can
cause a privacy breach to this person. In order to sidestep this issue
we change from absolute guarantees about disclosures to relative ones:
any given disclosure will be, within a small multiplicative factor, just
as likely whether or not the individual participates in the database. As
a consequence, there is a nominally increased risk to the individual in
participating, and only nominal gain to be had by concealing or mis-
representing one’s data. Note that a bad disclosure can still occur, but
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our guarantee assures the individual that it will not be the presence of
her data that causes it, nor could the disclosure be avoided through any
action or inaction on the part of the user.
Definition 2. A randomized function \scrK gives \epsilon -differential privacy if
for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all
S \subseteq \itR \ita \itn \itg \ite (\scrK ),
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\scrK (D1) \in S] \leq \mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}(\epsilon )\times \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\scrK (D2) \in S] (1)
A mechanism \scrK satisfying this definition addresses concerns that any
participant might have about the leakage of her personal information x:
even if the participant removed her data from the data set, no outputs
(and thus consequences of outputs) would become significantly more
or less likely. For example, if the database were to be consulted by
an insurance provider before deciding whether or not to insure Terry
Gross, then the presence or absence of Terry Gross in the database will
not significantly affect her chance of receiving coverage.
Later works further expound upon their position [48, 49].
A.3 Questions Raised about Differential Privacy
In 2011, papers started to question whether differential privacy actu-
ally provides a meaningful notion of privacy [31, 7, 50]. These papers
point to the fact that a released statistic can enable inferring sensitive
information about a person, similar to the attacks Dalenius wanted to
prevent [35], even when that statistic was computed using a differen-
tially private algorithm. While the earlier work on differential privacy
acknowledged this limitation, these papers provide examples where cor-
relations, or more generally associations, between data points can en-
able inferences that some people might not expect to be possible under
differential privacy. These works kicked off a second line of research
(including, e.g., [8, 27, 10, 11, 12, 13]) attempting to find stronger def-
initions that account for such correlations. In some cases, these papers
assert that such inferential threats are violations of privacy and not what
people expect of differential privacy. For example, Liu et al.’s abstract
states that associations between data points can lead to “degradation in
expected privacy levels” [13]. The rest of this subsection provides details
about these papers.
In 2011, Kifer and Machanavajjhala published a paper stating that
the first popularized claim about differential privacy is that “It makes
no assumptions about how data are generated” [7, p. 1]. The paper then
explains that “a major criterion for a privacy definition is the following:
can it hide the evidence of an individual’s participation in the data
generating process?” [7, p. 2]. It states [7, p. 2]:
We believe that under any reasonable formalization of evidence of par-
ticipation, such evidence can be encapsulated by exactly one tuple [as
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done by differential privacy] only when all tuples are independent (but
not necessarily generated from the same distribution). We believe this
independence assumption is a good rule of thumb when considering the
applicability of differential privacy.
For this reason, the paper goes on to say “Since evidence of participation
requires additional assumptions about the data (as we demonstrate in
detail in Sections 3 and 4), this addresses the first popularized claim
– that differential privacy requires no assumptions about the data” [7,
p. 2]. From context, we take “addresses” to mean invalidates since the
paper states “The goal of this paper is to clear up misconceptions about
differential privacy” [7, p. 2].
In 2012, Kifer and Machanavajjhala published follow up work stating
that “we use [the Pufferfish framework] to formalize and prove the state-
ment that differential privacy assumes independence between records” [8,
p. 1]. It goes on to say “Assumptionless privacy definitions are a myth: if
one wants to publish useful, privacy-preserving sanitized data then one
must make assumptions about the original data and data-generating
process” [8, p. 1, emphasis in original]. In 2014, Kifer and Machanava-
jjhala published a journal version of their 2012 paper, which makes a
similar statement: “Note that assumptions are absolutely necessary –
privacy definitions that can provide privacy guarantees without making
any assumptions provide little utility beyond the default approach of
releasing nothing at all” [27, p. 3:5]. However, this version is, overall,
more qualified. For example, it states “The following theorem says that
if we have any correlations between records, then some differentially pri-
vate algorithms leak more information than is allowable (under the odds
ratio semantics in Section 3.1)” [27, 3:12–13], which makes it clear that
the supposed shortcoming of differential privacy in the face of correlated
data points is relative to a particular notion of privacy presented in that
paper, roughly, reducing uncertainty about some sensitive fact about a
person.
Also in 2014, He et al. published a paper building upon the Puffer-
fish framework [10]. Referring to the conference version [8], He et al.
states [10, p. 1]:
[Kifer and Machanavajjhala] showed that differential privacy is equiv-
alent to a specific instantiation of the Pufferfish framework, where (a)
every property about an individual’s record in the data is kept secret,
and (b) the adversary assumes that every individual is independent of
the rest of the individuals in the data (no correlations). We believe
that these shortcomings severely limit the applicability of differential
privacy to real world scenarios that either require high utility, or deal
with correlated data.
and “Recent work [by Kifer and Machanavajjhala] showed that differ-
entially private mechanisms could still lead to an inordinate disclosure
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of sensitive information when adversaries have access to publicly known
constraints about the data that induce correlations across tuples” [10,
p. 3].
In 2013, Li et al. published a paper that states “differential privacy’s
main assumption is independence” [9, p. 2]. Similar, to the papers by
Kifer and Machanavajjhala, this paper assumes a technical definition of
privacy, positive membership privacy, and makes this assertion since in-
dependence is required for differential privacy to imply it. The paper also
claims that “the original definition of differential privacy assumes that
the adversary has precise knowledge of all the tuples in the dataset” [9,
p. 10], which we take as a reference to the strong adversary assumption.
Chen et al.’s 2014 paper is the first of three attempting to provide
an associative version of privacy, motivated by Pufferfish, in the face
of correlated data [11]. It states “\epsilon -differential privacy fails to provide
the claimed privacy guarantee in the correlated setting” [11, p. 2] and “\epsilon -
differential privacy is built on the assumption that all underlying records
are independent of each other” [11, p. 7].
The second paper, Zhu et al.’s paper, published in 2015, provides a
more accurate accounting of correlations [12]. It states [12, p. 229]:
An adversary with knowledge on correlated information will have higher
chance of obtaining the privacy information, and violating the defini-
tion of differential privacy. Hence, how to preserve rigorous differential
privacy in a correlated dataset is an emerging issue that needs to be
addressed.
It further asserts [12, p. 231]:
In the past decade, a growing body of literature has been published
on differential privacy. Most existing work assumes that the dataset
consists of independent records.
and “a major disadvantage of traditional differential privacy is the over-
look of the relationship among records, which means that the query
result leaks more information than is allowed” [12, p. 232].
The third paper, by Liu et al. in 2016, provides an even more accurate
accounting of correlations [13]. A blog post by one of the authors, Mittal,
announcing the paper states “To provide its guarantees, DP implicitly
assumes that the data tuples in the database, each from a different user,
are all independent.” [51]. In five comments on this blog post, McSherry
posted a summary of his concerns about their paper and blog post.
McSherry also treats the paper at length in a blog post [18]. McSherry
highlights three statements made by the paper that he finds false [18]: (1)
“For providing this guarantee, differential privacy mechanisms assume
independence of tuples in the database” [13, p. 1], (2) “To provide its
guarantees, DP mechanisms assume that the data tuples (or records) in
the database, each from a different user, are all independent.” [13, p. 1],
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and (3) “However, the privacy guarantees provided by the existing DP
mechanisms are valid only under the assumption that the data tuples
forming the database are pairwise independent” [13, p. 2].
A somewhat different tack is taken in a 2016 paper by Cuff and Yu,
which instead focuses on the strong adversary assumption [1, p. 2]:
The definition of (\epsilon , \delta )-DP involves a notion of neighboring database
instances. Upon examination one realizes that this has the affect of
assuming that the adversary has already learned about all but one en-
try in the database and is only trying to gather additional information
about the remaining entry. We refer to this as the strong adversary
assumption, which is implicit in the definition of differential privacy.
Yang et al.’s 2015 paper allows either assumption [14, §1.2]:
Differential privacy is designed to preserve the privacy in the face of in-
trusions by the strongest adversary who exactly knows everything about
all individual entities except the object of its attack. [. . .] In fact, as
we will show in Section 3, differential privacy does guarantee privacy
against intrusion by any adversary when all the entities in the database
are independent.
A.4 Responses
In addition to the aforementioned blog post by McSherry [18], other
works by those promoting the original view of differential privacy have
also re-asserted that differential privacy was never intended to prevent
all inferential privacy threats and that doing so is impossible [15, 16, 17].
In a different blog post, McSherry goes the furthest, questioning whether
wholesale inferential privacy is the normal meaning of “privacy” or even
an appealing concept [17]. He calls it “forgettability”, invoking the Eu-
ropean Union’s right to be forgotten, and points out that preventing
inferences prevents people from using data and scientific progress. He
suggests that perhaps people should only have an expectation to the
privacy of data they own, as provided by differential privacy, and not
to the privacy of data about them. He challenges the line of research
questioning differential privacy (Appendix A.3) to justify the view that
forgettability is a form of privacy.
We know no works explicitly responding to this challenge.
B. Counterexample Involving Zero Probability for
Strong Adversary D.P.
Consider Definition 2 modified to look at one distribution \scrP , which
represents the actual distribution of the world.
Definition 10. A randomized algorithm \scrA is said to be \epsilon -Strong Ad-
versary Differentially Private for One Distribution \scrP if for all databases
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d, d\prime \in \scrD n at Hamming distance at most 1, and for all output values o,
if \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[D=d] > 0 and \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[D=d\prime ] > 0 then
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D=d] \leq e\epsilon \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=o | D=d\prime ] (30)
where O = \scrA (D) and D = \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle .
To prove that this does not imply Definition 1, consider the case of
a database holding a single data point whose value could be 0, 1, or 2.
Suppose the population \scrP is such that \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D1=2] = 0. Consider an
algorithm \scrA such that for the given population \scrP ,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (0)=0] = 1/2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (0)=1] = 1/2 (31)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (1)=0] = 1/2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (1)=1] = 1/2 (32)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (2)=0] = 1 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (2)=1] = 0 (33)
The algorithm does not satisfy Definition 1 due to its behavior on the
input 2. However, using (3),
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=0 | D1=0] = 1/2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=1 | D1=0] = 1/2 (34)
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=0 | D1=1] = 1/2 \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP ,\scrA [O=1 | D1=1] = 1/2 (35)
While (3) says nothing about D1=2 since that has zero probability, this
is sufficient to show that the algorithm satisfies Definition 10 since it
only applies to data points of non-zero probability. Thus, the algorithm
satisfies Definition 10 but not Definition 1.
C. Details of Causation
Formally, let J\scrM K(\vec{}x).\vec{}Y be the joint distribution over values for the vari-
ables \vec{}Y that results from the background variables \vec{}X taking on the val-
ues \vec{}x (where these vectors use the same ordering). That is, J\scrM K(\vec{}x).\vec{}Y (\vec{}y)
represents the probability of \vec{}Y = \vec{}y given that the background variables
had values \vec{}X = \vec{}x. Since the SEM is non-recursive this can be calculated
in a bottom up fashion. We show this for the model \scrM \scrA with Di := Ri
for all i, D := \langle D1, . . . , Dn\rangle , and O := \scrA (D):
J\scrM \scrA K(r1, . . . , rn).Ri(ri) = 1 (36)
J\scrM \scrA K(r1, . . . , rn).Di(ri) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FDi [FDi(Ri)=ri] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FDi [Ri=ri] = 1 (37)
J\scrM \scrA K(r1, . . . , rn).D(\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle ) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(D1, . . . , Dn)=\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle ] (38)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(FD1(R1), . . . , FDn(Rn))=\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle ] (39)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(R1, . . . , Rn)=\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle ] (40)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [\langle R1, . . . , Rn\rangle =\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle ] = 1 (41)
and
J\scrM \scrA K(r1, . . . , rn).O(o) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FO [FO(D)=o] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle r1, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] (42)
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We can raise the calculations above to work over \scrP instead of a con-
crete assignment of values \vec{}x. Intuitively, the only needed change is that,
for background variables \vec{}X,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [\vec{}Y=\vec{}y] =
\sum 
\vec{}x\in \vec{}\scrX 
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP \scrA [ \vec{}X=\vec{}x] \ast J\scrM \scrA K(\vec{}x).\vec{}Y (\vec{}y) (43)
where \vec{}X are all the background variables.2 2 This is Pearl’s equation (7.2) raised to
work on probabilistic structural equa-
tions FV [19, p. 205].
The following lemma will not only be useful, but will illustrate the
above general points on the model \scrM \scrA that concerns us.
Lemma 1. For all algorithms \scrA , \scrP , all o, and all d1, . . . , dn,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1:=d1, . . . , Dn:=dn)] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d1, . . . , dn)=o]
(44)
Proof. Let Fdi() represent the constant function with no arguments that
always returns di. The structural equation for Di is Fdi in\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn].
As before, we compute bottom up, but this time on the modified SEM:
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn]K(r1, . . . , rn).Ri(ri) = 1 (45)
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn]K(r1, . . . , rn).Di(di) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}Fdi [Fdi()=di] = 1 (46)
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn]K(r1, . . . , rn).D(\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle ) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(D1, . . . , Dn)=\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle ] (47)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(FD1(), . . . , FDn())=\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle ] (48)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(d1, . . . , dn)=\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle ] (49)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle =\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle ] = 1 (50)
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn]K(r1, . . . , rn).O(o) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FO [FO(D)=o] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (51)
Thus,
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1:=d1, . . . , Dn:=dn)] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1]\cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn],\scrP [O=o] (52)
=
\sum 
\vec{}r\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [\vec{}R=\vec{}r] \ast J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d1] \cdot \cdot \cdot [Dn:=dn]K(\vec{}r).O(o) (53)
=
\sum 
\vec{}r\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [\vec{}R=\vec{}r] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (54)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] \ast 
\sum 
\vec{}r\in \scrR n \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [\vec{}R=\vec{}r] (55)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] \ast 1 (56)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d1, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (57)
Lemma 2. For all algorithms \scrA , \scrP , o, j, and d\prime j ,
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\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(Dj=d\prime j)] (58)
=
\sum 
\langle r1,...,rj - 1,rj+1,...,rn\rangle \in \scrR n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge i\in \{ 1,...,j - 1,j+1,...,n\} Ri=ri\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (r1, . . . , rj - 1, d\prime j , rj+1, . . . , rn)=o] (59)
=
\sum 
\langle d1,...,dj - 1,dj+1,...,dn\rangle \in \scrD n - 1
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP 
\bigl[ \wedge i\in \{ 1,...,j - 1,j+1,...,n\} Di=di\bigr] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (d1, . . . , dj - 1, d\prime j , dj+1, . . . , dn)=o] (60)
Proof. With out loss of generality, assume j is 1. Let Fd\prime 1() represent
the constant function with no arguments that always returns d\prime 1. The
structural equation for D1 is Fd\prime 1 in\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]. As before, we compute
bottom up, but this time on the modified SEM:
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).Ri(ri) = 1 (61)
holds as before. The behavior of Di varies based on whether i = 1:
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).D1(d\prime 1) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}Fd\prime 1 [Fd\prime 1()=d\prime 1] = 1 (62)J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).Di(ri) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FDi [FDi(Ri)=ri] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FDi [Ri=ri] = 1 for all i \not = 1 (63)
Thus,
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).D(\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle ) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(D1, D2 . . . , Dn)=\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle ] (64)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(Fd\prime 1(), FD2(R2), . . . , FDn(Rn))=\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle ]
(65)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [FD(d
\prime 
1, r2, . . . , rn)=\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle ] (66)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FD [\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , dn\rangle =\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle ] = 1 (67)
and
J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).O(o) = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}FO [FO(D)=o] = \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] (68)
Thus,
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\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA ,\scrP [O=o | \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}(D1:=d\prime 1)] (69)
= \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1],\scrP [O=o] (70)
=
\sum 
r1,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R1=r1, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast J\scrM \scrA [D1:=d\prime 1]K(r1, . . . , rn).O(o) (71)
=
\sum 
r1,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R1=r1, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] (72)
=
\sum 
r1,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R1=r1 | R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] (73)
=
\sum 
r2,...,rn\in \scrR n
\sum 
r1\in \scrR 
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R1=r1 | R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o]
(74)
=
\sum 
r2,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] \ast 
\sum 
r1\in \scrR \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R1=r1 | R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn]
(75)
=
\sum 
r2,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] \ast 1 (76)
=
\sum 
r2,...,rn\in \scrR n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [R2=r2, . . . , Rn=rn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, r2, . . . , rn\rangle )=o] (77)
=
\sum 
d2,...,dn\in \scrD n
\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrP [D2=d2, . . . , Dn=dn] \ast \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\scrA [\scrA (\langle d\prime 1, d2, . . . , dn\rangle )=o] (78)
where the last line follows since Di = Ri for i \not = 1.
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